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Abstract
We consider a model of dynamic price competition to analyze the impact of consumer
inertia on the ability of firms to sustain high prices. Three main consequences are iden-
tified: (i) maintaining high prices does not require punishment strategies when firms are
sufficiently myopic, (ii) if buyers are sufficiently inert, then high prices can be sustained
for all discount factors, and (iii) the ability to maintain high prices may depend non-
monotonically on the level of the discount factor. These results provide a number of
valuable insights with regard to competitive and collusive pricing behavior. For example,
our findings suggest that measures aiming at lowering the degree of consumer inertia may
in fact facilitate collusion in network industries.
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1 Introduction
Standard theory of industrial collusion assumes that firms essentially face a repeated prisoner’s
dilemma when attempting to fix prices above competitive levels. Slightly undercutting the
collusive price presumably leads to an immediate and substantial increase in sales and thereby
profits. Following modern economic theory, firms can sustain high prices by ensuring that
cheating does not go unpunished. There is an incentive to abide by the collusive agreement
when short-run gains of cheating fall short of future losses, which typically requires a credible
punishment strategy as well as a sufficiently high discount factor.1 The notion that colluding
oligopolists are confronted with an intertemporal trade-off between short-term gains and
future losses lies at the heart of most contributions to the theory of industrial collusion.
A critical assumption in these studies is that a seller can increase its sales instantly and
significantly by shaving its price below the agreed level. While clearly there are instances in
which consumers respond quickly to price changes, it is often more realistic to assume that
they will not switch suppliers instantaneously. For example, in many industries, customers
exhibit brand loyalty, switching costs or a lack of information on the price and quality of com-
peting products. Also, buyers may have established long-term contracts with their suppliers.2
These types of consumer inertia directly affect the intertemporal trade-off that oligopolists
face. Given that demand is viscous, undercutting the collusive price does not lead to a short-
term gain but a loss. This holds because individual demand is not immediately affected by
the change in price and existing customers spend less on the product or service. At the same
time, however, cutting price might lead to additional future profits as buyers may switch over
time to a lower priced firm.
The notion that buyers may not respond instantly to a price cut generates a number of
interesting questions. How does (the degree of) consumer inertia affect the ability of firms
to sustain collusion? Under what industry conditions can we expect firms to set high prices?
In this paper, we seek to shed some light on these and related issues. Towards that end,
we develop and analyze a reduced form model of dynamic price competition between two
firms. In any given period, customers are loyal to their supplier independent of the price
it charges.3 Both firms therefore have some market power over their existing customers.
Yet, buyers might switch suppliers in future periods when they observe a price difference.
Consequently, in deciding whether or not to cut price, firms are given the following options.
On the one hand, a seller may charge a high price and thereby exploit its current customer
1Friedman (1971) was among the first to show that collusion is sustainable in the context of an infinitely
repeated game when firms are sufficiently patient.
2Klemperer (1995) provides many arguments for why buyers may not instantly respond to a price cut.
3An alternative interpretation is that consumers face substantial switching costs. See, for example, Farrell
and Shapiro (1988) and Beggs and Klemperer (1992).
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base (‘harvesting incentive’). Yet, by doing so, it faces the risk of losing customers in the
future when its rival chooses to price low. Alternatively, a seller may charge a low price,
thereby foregoing short-run profits, but with some probability increase its market share in
the future (‘investment incentive’).
In deciding whether or not to deviate from the collusive price, there are at least three
factors that play an important role. First, this decision will be driven by the amount of
additional sales that can potentially be obtained by cutting price. This depends on the
relation between consumer tastes and preferences and product attributes. For instance, if
products are significantly differentiated, then a price cut will only attract a limited number of
additional buyers. Second, the decision depends on the likelihood that customers will indeed
switch suppliers. This is a dynamic factor, which includes loyalty and informational effects.
For example, a customer who purchased from a particular seller may, ceteris paribus, be more
inclined to buy from this seller in the future. That is, consumers might not always opt for the
cheapest product even when the products are functionally identical.4 Third, sustainability of
high prices depends on the value of expected additional sales. Indeed, like in the standard
model of collusion, the rate that is used to discount future profits is an important determinant
of strategic pricing behavior. The model studied in this paper incorporates all three factors.
Summarizing our main results, sustainability of high prices does not require punishment
strategies when firms are sufficiently myopic. This result holds for all customer preferences
and any degree of consumer inertia. Moreover, high prices can be sustained for all discount
factors when demand is sufficiently viscous. Finally, we find that the ability to maintain high
prices may depend non-monotonically on the level of the discount factor. That is to say,
collusion may be sustainable for extreme values of the discount factor, but not when firms
are moderately patient. For this to occur, it is required that the industry exhibits network
externalities and that buyers are sufficiently inert.
These results provide a number of interesting insights with regard to strategic pricing
behavior. For example, our analysis sheds some light on when we may expect competition
and collusion to lead to similar market outcomes.5 This is valuable information in light of
antitrust enforcement, particularly because economic methods of cartel detection typically
aim to discriminate between competitive and collusive pricing behavior.6 Moreover, for a
particular degree of consumer inertia, a credible and severe punishment strategy might be
insufficient to sustain high prices in some types of industries. In this case, firms may try
4One way to think about this is that there is an informational advantage about the quality of the product
when used before. As a consequence, a customer has to put some (costly) effort in finding out whether he
could better switch or not. Likewise, customers may be slow to become aware of the most attractive brand
due to a lack of (or a lag in) relevant information.
5This possibility is also suggested by Radner (2003).
6See Harrington (2008) for an overview and discussion of economic methods of cartel detection.
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to influence the level of inertia to create a situation in which high prices can be sustained.
For instance, sellers may facilitate collusion by agreeing not to advertise in each others home
markets.
To our knowledge, this paper is the first to analyze the impact of consumer inertia on
the sustainability of collusion while taking account of various degrees of demand viscosity
as well as different types of industry.7 The only other study we are aware of that considers
collusion in the presence of demand inertia is Padilla (1995). In the context of an infinitely
repeated duopoly game with homogeneous goods, this work reveals that (tacit) collusion may
be difficult to sustain when consumer switching costs are substantial. Switching costs reduce
the incentive to defect, but at the same time limit the impact of punishment strategies.
The latter effect is shown to dominate the former when switching costs are sufficiently large.
Our results suggest that this outcome is likely to depend on the type of industry under
consideration. Specifically, we find that demand viscosity may make it difficult to sustain
high prices in network industries, whereas it may facilitate collusion in traditional markets.
This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, the model is introduced and described.
Section 3 solves the model and provides a full characterization of high price equilibria. In
Section 4, we discuss some implications of our main findings. All proofs are relegated to the
Appendix.
2 Model
Our prime purpose is to explore the qualitative impact of consumer inertia on the ability of
firms to sustain high prices. Towards that end, we study a stylized model in which two firms
interact over a time horizon of possibly infinite length. The structure of the model is concisely
depicted in Figure 1.
At each point in time, firms find themselves in one of three states: the competitive state
(state 2) or an absorbing monopolistic state in which one of them has captured the entire
market (state 1 and state 3). Starting in the competitive state, firms simultaneously and
independently choose between two prices: a high (collusive) price H or a low (competitive)
price L. These price choices affect immediate profits as well as the state transition.
We assume that demand is viscous in that customers will not respond instantly to price
changes. As a result, both firms can temporarily exploit their installed customer base. In
competition, each firm’s sales are given by the parameter s ∈ (0, 1). For ease of analysis,
production costs are assumed to be absent. Consequently, depending on whether firms opted
for H or L, profits in the competitive state are respectively given by sh or s` (with h > ` > 0).
7Strategic pricing behavior in the presence of demand viscosity is also studied in Chen and Rosenthal (1996)
and Radner (2003). However, these papers do not consider consumer inertia in relation to (tacit) collusion.
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Figure 1: A duopolistic model of dynamic price competition with consumer inertia. In each cell, the
north-west part shows respectively the profit of firm 1 (the row player) and firm 2 (the column player);
the south-east part shows respectively the probability to transit to state 1, state 2 and state 3.
In a monopolistic state, the surviving firm is assumed to make a profit of h in every period.
Despite the fact that the price choice does not affect current market shares, it can affect
future sales and profits. If both firms choose the same action, then buyers remain loyal to their
supplier and play resumes with probability 1 in the competitive state. When actions differ,
buyers consider switching to the firm that set the low price. Specifically, if firm i chooses L
and its rival chooses H, then play resumes with probability p ∈ (0, 1] in the absorbing state
in which firm i is a monopolist. With probability 1 − p, play resumes in the competitive
state. Thus, cutting price leads to a decrease in short-term profits with certainty, but it also
potentially increases future profits.
Both parameters p and s have a broader interpretation. The parameter p is the probability
that a price cut is successful in attracting additional sales. It therefore captures the degree
of consumer inertia. For example, higher values of p correspond to lower switching costs,
more price awareness or less brand loyalty. The parameter s represents the sales of a firm in
competition relative to the sales it makes as a monopolist. When s ≥ 12 , total sales in the
competitive state (weakly) exceed the amount a monopolist can sell. This is characteristic
for markets with differentiated goods or when products are complements. Thus, a larger s
can be interpreted as a higher level of differentiation or complementarity. By contrast, when
s < 12 , total sales are higher when the market is served by one firm. This is typically the case
when both firms sell incompatible network goods. A smaller s then corresponds to a higher
level of consumptive externalities. The parameters p and s thus allow us to take account of
various degrees of demand viscosity and different types of markets.
Given a common discount factor δ ∈ [0, 1), both firms maximize the expected present value
of their profit stream. Notice that the presence of demand viscosity gives firms temporary
market power, which fundamentally alters the intertemporal trade-off that oligopolists face
in traditional models of industrial collusion. In a repeated prisoner’s dilemma, firms compare
short-term gains with future losses when deciding whether or not to cut price. If buyers are
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inert, then undercutting the collusive price is beneficial only when expected future profits
outweigh short-term losses. Hence, firms have to decide whether to exploit their current
customer base by charging a high price or to increase (or protect) their market share by
setting a low price.
Before proceeding to the analysis, there are several assumptions of the model that war-
rant some discussion. First, there is only one competitive state and it is assumed that leaving
this state is an irreversible act (i.e., there is no way back). Moreover, if buyers switch their
supplier, then they do so in an orchestrated manner. As our objective is to study sustain-
ability of collusion, one competitive state is sufficient. Of particular importance is that this
state incorporates the intertemporal trade-off between exploiting the installed customer base
and future profit opportunities. The way we have modeled consumer inertia in combination
with the two absorbing monopolistic states captures this trade-off perfectly. Specifically, the
assumption that the (expected) future gain is represented by a state that is both monopolistic
and absorbing is anything but crucial.8 In fact, any potential reward would have sufficed.
Second, the action set is limited to two prices. In this respect, it is worth noting that
Pot et al. (2011) studies a similar model. All results presented in that paper, as far as these
are comparable, are consistent with Chen and Rosenthal (1996) and Radner (2003), both of
which allow sellers to choose from a continuum of prices. In principle, we could extend the
action space. However, this would make it significantly more complicated to provide a full
characterization of high price (subgame perfect) equilibria, which is vital to studying collusive
behavior.
3 Results
The framework introduced in the previous section is contained in the class of finite discounted
stochastic games and we will use the conventional concepts and methods. The most general
type of strategy a firm can formulate in this setting is a behavior strategy in which decisions
are conditioned on state, time, full history of all visited states and all actions chosen. Given
the initial state, a pair of behavior strategies constitutes a Nash equilibrium when neither
of the firms can improve its (expected) profits by unilaterally adopting another behavior
strategy. One particular type of behavior strategy that firms can employ is a stationary
strategy in which decisions are independent of time and history and therefore conditioned on
states only. A pair of stationary strategies that constitutes a Nash equilibrium is called a
stationary equilibrium. The Nash equilibrium is subgame perfect when there does not exist
any combination of state, time and history that allows a supplier to profitably defect.
8This is shown explicitly in Pot, Flesch, Peeters and Vermeulen (2011), where a similar model is studied.
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The next result establishes that high prices can be supported as a stationary subgame
perfect equilibrium if and only if the discount factor is sufficiently low.
Proposition 1 (stationary behavior). High prices are sustainable as a stationary subgame
perfect equilibrium if and only if
δ ≤ δH ≡ s (h−`)s (h−`)+p (1−s)h .
There exists no high price stationary subgame perfect equilibrium for sufficiently large dis-
count factors as in that case the investment incentive dominates the harvesting incentive.
Yet, high prices may still be sustainable as a subgame perfect equilibrium when firms adopt
trigger strategies. A trigger strategy basically consists of three parts: (1) a specification of
the collusive strategy, (2) a specification of a punishment strategy to be employed in the event
of deviation from the collusive strategy, and (3) a specification of a strategy to be adopted
when punished by the rival.
Clearly, firms choose high prices in the collusive phase. In case of defection, the most
effective punishment is to price low.9 Notice that as the punishment strategy is stationary, the
deviating firm has a stationary best response. However, whether the punished firm responds
by setting a high or a low price depends on the level of the discount factor. Specifically,
the punished firm optimally charges a low price when δ ≥ δL ≡ h−`h−(1−p) ` and a high price
when δ < δL. The reason for this is that the immediate costs of fighting for survival exceed
the future benefits of being in the competitive state when the discount factor is below the
threshold δL.
In sum, the trigger strategy for both firms is given by
T =

H if L has not been chosen in any of the previous periods (collusion)
L if the rival was the first to choose L (punishment)
H if one was the first to choose L and δ < δL (response to punishment)
L if one was the first to choose L and δ ≥ δL (response to punishment).
Observe that the way in which the punishment affects the deviating firm’s future profits differs
for the two different ranges of the discount factor. For discount factors below δL, there are
no consequences for the future per-period profits as long as the market is in the competitive
state. Yet, in every future period, there is a probability to be driven from the market. For
discount factors above δL, there is a relative loss in all future per-period profits, but none of
the firms will ever obtain a monopoly position.
Next, we explore when the trigger strategy profile constitutes a subgame perfect equilib-
rium. For this to be the case, there are two requirements. First, the strategies employed in
9Indeed, charging a low price in each period following the period of defection is the most severe punishment
strategy in our setting. Therefore, if high prices cannot be sustained by adopting this strategy, then collusion
will not occur in any subgame perfect equilibrium.
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the punishment phase should constitute a (stationary) subgame perfect equilibrium. Second,
deviation from the coordinated high price strategies should not be beneficial. The following
proposition establishes that the first requirement is always satisfied.
Proposition 2 (punishment). Decisions in the punishment phase constitute a stationary
subgame perfect equilibrium.
The conditions under which the second requirement is met depend on the value of the discount
factor δ relative to the threshold δL as this determines the optimal strategy in the punishment
phase.
Proposition 3 (sustainability). Suppose δ ≥ δL. High prices are sustainable in subgame
perfect equilibrium if and only if
δ ≤ δLL ≡ s (h−`)p (h−s `) .
Suppose δH < δ < δL. High prices are sustainable in subgame perfect equilibrium if and only
if
δ 6∈ ( δ−LH , δ+LH ),
with
δ−LH ≡
2 (1−p) s (h−`)+p (h−s `)−
√
[2 (1−p) s (h−`)+p (h−s `)]2−4 (1−p) s (h−`) [s (h−`)+p h]
2 (1−p) [s (h−`)+p h]
and
δ+LH ≡
2 (1−p) s (h−`)+p (h−s `)+
√
[2 (1−p) s (h−`)+p (h−s `)]2−4 (1−p) s (h−`) [s (h−`)+p h]
2 (1−p) [s (h−`)+p h] .
The first part of Proposition 3 specifies the condition under which high prices are sustainable
when in the punishment phase the punishing firm sets low prices and the deviating firm
responds optimally by charging a low price. The condition states that high prices can be
maintained as long as the discount factor does not exceed δLL. Observe that the threshold
δLL can give rise to two scenarios. If δLL is less than one, then high prices cannot be sustained
for high discount factors (Scenario 2). Alternatively, if δLL exceeds one, then high prices are
sustainable for sufficiently large discount factors (Scenario 1).
The second part of Proposition 3 specifies the condition under which high prices are sus-
tainable when in the punishment phase the punishing firm sets low prices and the deviator
responds optimally with a high price. The condition shows that, with the exception of an
interval of intermediate values of the discount factor, high prices are sustainable in equilib-
rium. As before, two scenarios may arise, depending on whether the interval (δ−LH , δ
+
LH) has
a nonempty intersection with the interval (δH , δL) (Scenario b) or not (Scenario a).
10
Combining Propositions 1, 2 and 3, the next result summarizes our findings so far.
10Note that non-emptiness of the interval (δH , δL) requires s <
h
h+`
.
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Theorem 4. The effect of the discount factor on the sustainability of high prices as a (sta-
tionary) subgame perfect equilibrium takes one of the four forms as depicted in Figure 2.
-
0 1 δ
Scenario 1–a SSPE SPE
Scenario 2–a SSPE SPE
Scenario 1–b SSPE SPE SPE
Scenario 2–b SSPE SPE SPE
Figure 2: Sustainability of high prices by means of stationary strategies (SSPE) and trigger strategies
(SPE) for different values of the discount factor. The values of the thresholds depend on the parameters
h, `, s and p and are therefore not necessarily the same among the different scenarios.
Theorem 4 reveals that the presence of consumer inertia results in three main differences
compared to an infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game. First, while it is well-known that
in standard models of collusion high prices can be sustained in a subgame perfect equilibrium
when the discount factor is sufficiently high, we here find a reversed effect. In all four scenarios,
high prices are an equilibrium outcome when the discount factor is sufficiently low. The
explanation for this is that firms have a short-term focus when the discount factor is low. If
buyers are inert, then firms maximize their profits through exploiting their current customer
base by setting a high price. Moreover, for very low discount factors, any change in future
market shares is considered to be of little importance and setting a high price is a strictly
dominant strategy.
A second difference caused by consumer inertia is the possibility that high prices are
sustainable as a subgame perfect equilibrium for all values of the discount factor (Scenario
1–a). As Theorem 4 shows, for high discount factors this may require the use of trigger
strategies. If firms know that defecting will evoke a punishment phase in which low prices
will be set in all future periods, then their only incentive to deviate is the possibility to obtain
a monopoly position. However, if demand is viscous or when only a few extra consumers can
be gained by cutting price, then this potential “reward” may be insufficient to justify the
immediate profit decrease that results from choosing a low rather than a high price. If this
is the case, then high prices can be sustained in equilibrium independent of the value of the
discount factor.
A third difference is that there may be a non-monotonicity in the sustainability of high
prices (Scenario 1–b and 2–b). This striking result can occur for intermediate values of the
discount factor. In this range, deviating from the trigger strategy is followed by a punishment
phase in which the deviator responds optimally to the low price of its rival by setting a high
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price. In this case, the deviating firm foregoes part of its immediate profit in exchange for a
chance to become a monopolist. In case monopoly is not attained, per-period profits of the
deviator will be at collusive levels from the next period onwards, because choosing a high
price is the optimal response to the punishment. Notice, however, that as the punishing
firm sets a low price, the deviator faces the risk of losing its market share in every period.
These rather subtle differences in the timing of different profit streams can give rise to the
irregularity. Hypothetically, if we would let the discount factor increase from zero, we would
find a threshold above which the expected profits of acquiring a monopoly position in period
t+ 1 outweigh the immediate costs of cutting price in period t. At this point, high prices can
no longer be supported as an equilibrium. Yet, if we would let the discount factor increase
more, then the expected costs of losing market share from period t + 2 onwards gains more
weight. As a result, deviating becomes less attractive and high prices become sustainable
again.
Which of the four scenarios applies depends on the value of the parameters p and s, as
the next result indicates.
Theorem 5. The relation between the parameters p and s and the scenarios of Theorem 4 is
as depicted in Figure 3.
-
s0 1
6p
0
1
1
2
1–a
2–a
1–bﬀ
2–b
@R
Figure 3: Relation between parameters and scenarios.
Scenarios 1–a and 1–b are characterized by high prices being sustainable for values of the
discount factor arbitrarily close to one. Theorem 5 reveals that this situation arises for low
values of p and high values of s. In this case, chances of successful monopolization are low and
the additional sales that can be obtained by cutting price are limited. As explained below
Theorem 4, the reward of monopolization is not sufficient to justify the immediate profit
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decrease that results from choosing a low instead of a high price. This can be illustrated by
looking at two extreme cases. If p = 0, it is impossible to acquire a monopoly position and the
high price strategy is (weakly) dominant for all values of the discount factor. If s = 1, then
the collusive profits are equal to the monopoly profits. Consequently, firms have no incentive
to strive for a monopoly position and setting a high price is a dominant strategy for any level
of the discount factor.
In Scenario 2–a and Scenario 2–b, high prices are not sustainable for discount factors
sufficiently close to one. Theorem 5 reveals that this situation may arise for high values of p
and low values of s. In this case, the probability of successful monopolization is significant
and firms can potentially increase their sales substantially by cutting price. Looking at the
extreme case where p = 1, undercutting the collusive price is guaranteed to be successful and
firms that are sufficiently patient will surely aim to monopolize the market (or equivalently,
avoid being monopolized). In the other extreme case where s = 0, investment costs are zero
and the punishment strategy will be completely ineffective. Therefore, both firms would price
aggressively to gain market share (or equivalently, not to lose any).
Finally, the banana-shaped area in Figure 3 reveals that the non-monotonicity in the
sustainability of high prices (Scenario 1–b and 2–b) can only occur for relatively low values
of s and p. In particular, such non-monotonicities are absent for values of s above 12 .
Corollary 6 (traditional industries). Suppose s ≥ 12 . If high prices can be sustained at a
given discount factor, then these can also be sustained at any lower discount factor.
Hence, only when s is sufficiently low (but certainly less than 12), sustainability of high prices
may depend non-monotonically on the level of the discount factor. Furthermore, it is required
that p is not too high, but not too low either.
Corollary 7 (network industries). Suppose s < 12 . It is possible that high prices cannot
be sustained at a given discount factor, whereas these can be sustained for lower and higher
values of the discount factor.
4 Discussion
A common assumption in the theory of industrial collusion is that undercutting the collusive
price leads to an instant and substantial increase in sales and profits. In many industries,
however, buyers are hesitant to switch suppliers in response to a price cut. This may for
example be due to switching costs, contractual commitments and brand loyalty. In this
paper, we have explored the impact of such consumer inertia on the ability of firms to sustain
high prices. Contrary to predictions of the standard model of collusion, high prices are always
sustainable when the value of expected future profits is sufficiently low. Moreover, there is a
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possibility that high prices can be maintained for all values of the discount factor. Finally,
whether or not collusion is feasible may depend non-monotonically on the patience level of
firms. If firms are only moderately patient, then high prices might not be sustainable when
the industry exhibits network effects and demand is sufficiently viscous.
These results provide a number of interesting and important insights with regard to strate-
gic firm behavior. First, our analysis reveals that high prices can be supported as a stationary
subgame perfect equilibrium. Thus, setting high prices does not necessarily require an implicit
or explicit coordination of actions. In particular, no triggers or threats are needed to reach the
most profitable market outcome. High prices can therefore emerge naturally in competition
and do not necessarily result from collusive practices. As such, this result is not new. For
example, in markets with differentiated goods, firms typically have the power to raise prices
without losing too many customers. Yet, a fundamental difference with our results is that the
stationary high price equilibrium can occur in all four scenarios and therefore does not rely
on the degree of consumer inertia and differentiation (type of market). Consequently, high
prices in competition may not be driven only by a demand-side characteristic (e.g., consumer
taste). In fact, we find that it is caused by a supply-side characteristic; the patience level of
firms as reflected by the discount factor.
Moreover, when firms are sufficiently myopic, the stationary high price equilibrium is the
unique equilibrium outcome. As the patience level of firms is typically unknown, this raises the
question of how to distinguish between competitive and collusive pricing behavior. Arguably,
low prices is the preferred market outcome from the perspective of consumers. Yet, in this
situation, it seems difficult to effectively incentivize firms to no longer charge high prices. In
particular, it is doubtful whether standard antitrust remedies can be effective in this case,
because clearly no collusive conduct can be demonstrated when firms set high prices without
coordinating their actions. There seems to be no obvious solution to this problem. Perhaps,
regulating prices is currently the only available measure to improve consumer welfare in this
particular situation.
A second main finding is that high price equilibria may exist for all values of the discount
factor (Scenario 1–a). This occurs when buyers are sufficiently inert or when the number
of customers that can be gained by cutting price is limited. Hence, the market situation
and consumer characteristics might be such that firms always have a possibility to sustain
high prices. This can potentially be remedied by lowering the degree of consumer inertia.
Theorem 5 shows that, ceteris paribus, by increasing p (the likelihood that a price reduction
results in attracting more consumers), we may end up in Scenario 2–a; a state in which high
prices cannot be sustained for high levels of the discount factor. Thus, our analysis indicates
that it may be worthwhile to take measures that result in less demand viscosity. For instance,
our findings provide some support for decisions that lead to more price transparency and
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short-term contracts.11 If such measures are successful and firms are sufficiently patient, then
this may provide them with an incentive to charge low prices.
We furthermore find that, under certain conditions, high prices cannot be sustained for
moderate values of the discount factor, while these would be sustainable for more extreme
values of the discount factor. This can occur only when the industry exhibits network effects
or when there is a lack of a common standard. The fact that the ability of firms to maintain
high prices can depend non-monotonically on the level of the discount factor may have some
important implications. For example, suppose that an economy-wide restriction on long-term
contracts is introduced in order to reduce the level of consumer inertia. Although this can
have a beneficial effect in some markets for reasons described above, it potentially helps firms
to escape from Scenario b and bring them into Scenario a. Consequently, measures that
aim to lower the degree of consumer inertia can have adverse effects and, in fact, facilitate
collusion in network industries.
It is important to realize that the applicable scenarios are partly endogenous. That is to
say, both the parameters p and s can to some extent be influenced by firms and therefore
can potentially be used to facilitate collusion. For example, if firms are very patient and
find themselves in Scenario 2–a, then they could try to enhance consumer inertia (e.g., take
measures to increase switching costs). This may bring them into Scenario 1–a in which high
prices can be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium. Depending on the magnitude,
measures increasing consumer inertia may even create a situation in which high prices become
sustainable in stationary strategies in which case no coordination of actions is required to get
the most profitable market outcome. Similarly, if firms find themselves in the “non-monotonic
area” of Scenario b, then they can try to affect the degree of consumer inertia to end up in
Scenario a in which the non-monotonicity is absent. Observe that, in this case, an increase
as well as a decrease in the level of consumer inertia can have the desired effect. Hence,
firms may implement apparently pro-competitive measures that reduce the level of consumer
inertia, with the sole purpose to create a situation in which high prices can be sustained.
These considerations imply that there are distinct possibilities for firms to benefit from
communication in markets where buyers are inert. Particularly, agreeing to influence demand
inertia might be equally effective, but easier to arrange and less conspicuous than a price-fixing
agreement.12 Trying to change the level of consumer inertia is potentially more effective than
fixing prices directly as it alters the incentives of firms to set a high or a low price. This type of
11Note, however, that increasing price transparency may have adverse effects when it allows firms to better
observe the transaction prices of their rivals. See Albaek, Mollgaard and Overgaard (1997) in which it is
suggested that the publication of firm-specific transaction prices in Danish markets for concrete led to a
significant increase in prices.
12See, for instance, Genesove and Mullin (2001) who describe how the Sugar Cartel in the U.S. (1927-1936)
colluded on various business practices so as to facilitate price collusion.
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strategy can be especially beneficial in markets with network effects, because in those markets
it is most rewarding to acquire a dominant market position by becoming the standard. As we
show in Bos, Peeters and Pot (forthcoming), the presence of demand viscosity also provides
an explanation for why firms may choose to explicitly agree on prices rather than tacitly
coordinating their conduct. Firms that talk about prices act in breach of antitrust rules
and typically risk a fine or even a prison sentence. These (expected) costs make short-term
profits relatively more important and if demand is viscous, then these short-term gains are
maximized by setting high prices. Thus, antitrust enforcement may effectively function as a
commitment device.13 In sum, our findings suggest that it may be more fruitful for society
to try to affect firms’ incentives by changing levels of consumer inertia rather than to punish
behavior caused by adverse incentives.
13McCutcheon (1997) also shows that antitrust enforcement may have adverse effects when it makes collusion
costly, but not too costly, but for a different reason. This paper argues that the expected costs created by
antitrust law enforcement may prevent renegotiations in case of defection. Hence, antitrust can help in making
the punishment strategy credible, thereby facilitating collusion.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. For the proof we make use of the well-known property that a
firm always has a stationary best response against a rival adopting a stationary strategy.
Given that the rival adopts the stationary high price strategy, the present value of the profits
that results from responding with the stationary strategy that prescribes to select the high
respectively the low price is given by:
VH = s h+ δ VH and VL = s `+ δ { p h1−δ + (1− p)VL }.
High prices are sustainable as a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium if and only if the
stationary high price strategy is a best response. This is the case when
VH ≥ VL ⇐⇒ s h1−δ ≥ (1−δ) s `+δ p h(1−δ)(1−δ (1−p)) ⇐⇒ δ ≤ s (h−`)s (h−`)+p (1−s)h .
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose that the rival adopts the stationary low price strategy.
Responding with the stationary low price strategy is optimal if and only if
s `
1−δ ≥ s h1−δ (1−p) ⇐⇒ δ ≥ h−`h−`+p ` .
Consequently, the optimal response is to adopt the stationary high price strategy when δ <
h−`
h−`+p ` .
Vice versa, the stationary low price strategy must be a best response to the strategy
adopted by the firm that deviated (high prices for discount factors below δL and low prices
for larger discount factors). For discount factors exceeding δL, it follows by symmetry. For
discount factors below δL it is implied by Proposition 1, because that result shows that for
δ > δH the stationary low price strategy is optimal when the rival adopts the stationary high
price strategy.
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose δ ≥ δL and the rival adheres to the trigger strategy.
Then, the present value of adhering to the trigger strategy equals s h1−δ , while a deviation
generates a present value of s ` + δ { p h1−δ + (1 − p) s `1−δ }. It can be easily verified that
deviating is not profitable if δ < δLL.
Suppose now that δH < δ < δL and the rival adheres to the trigger strategy. Then, the
present value of adhering to the trigger strategy equals s h1−δ , while deviating to the low price
generates a present value of s ` + δ { p h1−δ + (1 − p) s h1−(1−p) δ }. It can be easily verified that
deviating is not profitable if δ is such that
(1− p) [s (h− `) + p h] · δ2 − [2 (1− p) s (h− `) + p (h− s `)] · δ + s (h− `) ≥ 0.
This quadratic inequality is satisfied when δ is smaller than δ−LH or larger than δ
+
LH .
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Proof of Theorem 4 and Theorem 5. We prove both theorems along the following
lines. First, we provide the conditions that determine whether the model is in Scenario 1 or
in Scenario 2. Next, the conditions that distinguish scenario a and b are derived. Finally, we
show – after illustrating the conditions graphically – that all combinations of conditions are
compatible. More precisely, we show that, for each h and `, there exist values of p and s such
that the conditions are met.
Scenario 1 and 2. The only condition that needs to be satisfied for the model to be in
Scenario 1 is δLL > 1; or, p <
s (h−`)
h−s ` . Otherwise, the model is in Scenario 2.
Scenario a and b. There are three conditions that need to be satisfied for the model to
be in Scenario b: (1) δ−LH , δ
+
LH ∈ R; (2) δ−LH < δL; and (3) δLL > δL.
Condition (1). Without the first condition the intersection of (δ−LH , δ
+
LH) with (δH , δL) is
guaranteed to be nonempty. This condition is satisfied if and only if p ≥ 4h s2 (h−`)
4h s2 (h−`)+(h−s `)2 .
Condition (2). It can be easily verified that, whenever the first condition is satisfied, δ+LH ≥
δ−LH > δH . The second condition guarantees that the earlier intersection is nonempty, and
hence there is a range of discount factors in (δH , δL) for which high prices are not sustainable.
This condition is satisfied if and only if
[h− `+ p `]√[2 (1− p) s (h− `) + p (h− s `)]2 − 4 (1− p) s (h− `) [s (h− `) + p h]
> p (h− s `)[h− `+ p `]− 2 p (1− p) (h− `) (h− s `).
This inequality is certainly satisfied when the right hand side is negative, i.e., p < h−`2h−` .
Suppose next that the right hand side is positive. Then, with some effort, the inequality can
be rearranged to p (h− 2 s `) > s (h− `).
Condition (3). The third condition warrants that there is range of discount factors just above
δL for which high prices are sustainable by means of trigger strategies. By continuity of the
present values it follows that this condition implies that there is also a range of discount
factors just below δL for which high prices are sustainable. Hence, this condition implies
δ+LH < δL. This condition is satisfied if and only if p (h− 2 s `) < s (h− `).
Notice that the second and third condition are incompatible when p > h−`2h−` . From this it
can be concluded that Scenario b can only occur when p < h−`2h−` .
Graphical representation of conditions. Figure 4 plots the relevant curves. Curve c.1
plots precisely the parameter values separating Scenario 1 and 2: p = s (h−`)h−s ` . The other three
curves – c.2, c.3 and c.4 – enclose Scenario b. First, curve c.2 plots the values of p above which
condition (1) is satisfied; that is, p = 4h s
2 (h−`)
4h s2 (h−`)+(h−s `)2 . Next, curve c.3 plots the values of p
below which condition (2) is satisfied, while enabling compatibility of condition (2) and (3):
p = h−`2h−` . Finally, curve c.4 captures the condition p (h − 2 s `) < s (h − `). For s ≥ h2 ` this
condition is satisfied for all values of p. For lower values of s it requires p < s (h−`)h−2 s ` . Curve c.4
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Figure 4: Relation between parameters and scenarios.
plots the values for which p = s (h−`)h−2 s ` . All values of p and s to the south-east of this curve,
and only these values, are compatible with condition (3).
Non-emptiness of the areas. Suppose for the moment that s < h2 ` . Curve c.2 is below
curve c.4 if and only if (2h+ `)2 s2− 2h (2h+ `) s+h2 > 0, which is satisfied for all s except
for s = 0 and s = h2h+` . At the latter point the two curves are tangent to each other, and
the corresponding value of p at this point is h−`2h−` . Hence, both curves intersect curve c.3 at
precisely this point. Notice that this is at a value of s below h2 ` , which is in agreement with
our supposition. This guarantees non-emptiness of Scenario b. Next, non-emptiness of the
area 2–b results from curve c.1 being below curve c.4 with exception of the origin. Finally,
non-emptiness of the area 1–b follows from the slope of curve c.2 being less than the slope of
curve c.1 at the origin: 0 < h−`h .
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